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I. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by James LeRoy Eagar ("Eagar") from the May 12, 1999 final 
judgment of the Honorable Rodney F. Page of the Second Judicial District Court of Davis 
County, State of Utah in favor of appellees (collectively "Bell"). Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996), this appeal was assigned to this Court which has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q) (1996). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court incorrectly rule that the parties' warehouse lease was 
unambiguous and excluding pivotal extrinsic evidence? Whether a contract is ambiguous 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 
1358-59 (Utah 1996). Only where a contract is unambiguous can the trial court interpret it 
as a matter of law. That interpretation is also reviewed for correctness. See id. This issue 
was raised in the trial court at R. 97-188; 194-299; 303-318; 319-337. 
2. Did disputed issues of material fact summary judgment for Bell? Because 
summary judgment involves only legal issues, this Court affords no deference to the trial 
court's factual conclusions. See Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 
1998). This issue was raised in the trial court at R. 97-188; 194-299; 319-337. 
3. Did the trial court err in denying Eagar's motion for partial summary 
judgment? Because summary judgment involves only legal issues, this Court affords no 
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deference to the trial court's factual conclusions. Id. This issue was raised in the trial court 
atR. 303-318; 504-515. 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and Utah Code. Jud. Admin. R. 4-501 are determinative. See 
Addendum. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves Eagar's sale of J. L. Eagar, Inc. (the "Business"), which sells and 
distributes products and equipment in the aqua-cultural industry worldwide. The aqua-
culture industry involves the production, rearing, planting, replenishing and/or conservation 
of various fresh and salt water fish species, seafood and shell fish. 
Eagar founded and built the Business from the ground up, devoting nearly 20 years 
of hard work, sacrifice, attention to detail and steadfast marketing efforts to create a national, 
and later international, reputation. Eventually, Eagar decided to sell the Business and retire. 
L. Stanley Bell purchased it. The Business was thriving when it was sold to Bell. As a result 
of pending bids and contracts, the Business yielded more profit in Bell's first year of 
ownership than in any prior year. 
Bell also wanted to lease from Eagar the Property on which the Business was operated 
and, after the purchase, Bell operated the Business on the Property. A disagreement 
developed over the terms of the lease and, fundamentally, whether a binding lease existed. 
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Bell sued, alleging that the parties specified and agreed to all material terms of a lease, and 
requested declaratory relief. Eagar counterclaimed, alleging that although the parties had 
attempted to negotiate a lease, they never agreed upon a mutually-acceptable lease. Eagar 
also requested declaratory relief. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court granted Bell's motion for partial summary judgment and denied 
Eagar's motion for partial summary judgment on May 12, 1999. R. 539-541; 590 at 28-30. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. Eagar's Decision to Sell the Business. 
Eagar operated and owned the "Business" until January of 1997. R. 116 at J^ 4. 
Eagar contacted Business Resource Center ("BRC"), a business brokerage company, in 
September, 1996, expressing an interest in selling the Business. See id. at ^ J 5; R. 220 at f^ 
4. Eagar and BRC's Ted Brasssard ("Brassard") discussed the terms of a possible sale. See 
R. 117 at Tf 6; R. 220 at ^ f 5. Whether Eagar would lease the Property was also discussed. 
See R. 117 at f 7; R. 220 at f^ 6. However, at the time, Eagar preferred not to lease the 
Property, anticipating instead its prompt sale. See R. 117 at ^ j 8; R. 220 at ^ f 7. In subsequent 
conversations with Brassard, Eagar reluctantly agreed to "consider" leasing the Property to 
the buyer of the Business, but only if the terms "were fair". See R. 117 at ^  9; R. 220 at f 8 . 
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2. Sale and Lease Negotiations. 
BRC's Larry Hatch ("Hatch") helped Bell prepare a written offer (the "Offer") to 
purchase the Business on December 11,1996. See R. 117 at ^ f 10; R. 220 at ^ f 9. Paragraph 
8 of the Offer requested a ten-year property lease with monthly payments of $2,281.00. See 
R. 117 at TI11; R. 220 at ^ f 10. Bell's proposed payment - which was the same amount Eagar 
had charged himself— fell well below market value. Eagar informed Hatch and Brassard 
that he rejected the Offer because he would not commit to such a discounted lease payment 
for ten years. See R. 117 at 112; R. 220 at If 11. 
Bell through Hatch, asked Eagar to consider the $2,281.00 lease payment for the first 
two years to help Bell maintain the success of the Business after the purchase. Eagar told 
Hatch that he would agree to the low lease payment, but only for two years. Eagar stressed 
that after two years, the lease payment had to increase to fair market value, using words to 
that effect. Hatch said that they could raise rent to fair market value after the second year by 
incorporating the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") in the lease. Eagar told Hatch that if 
referring to the CPI in the lease would ensure that lease payments would increase and remain 
at fair market value after two years, he would agree. See R. 117 at ^ f 13; R. 220-21 at ^ f 12. 
Later, Brassard and Eagar discussed the Eagar/Hatch conversation. Eagar essentially 
restated what he told Hatch; he would agree to the low lease payment for two years, then the 
amount had to increase by referring to the CPI to a "fair level", or fair- market value, where 
it must remain for the remaining lease term. See R. 221 at f 13. 
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Based on this information, Brassard prepared a written counteroffer (the 
"Counteroffer") which included the following term: "Lease 5 year. Triple Net. Fix Rate 
First 24 Month. $2,281 + 3 Net Balance 3 years. Tie to CPI plus one 5 year option." See R. 
221 a t ! 13; 223. Bell accepted. See R. 221 at^ f 16. 
3. Documenting the Sale and Efforts to Document a Lease. 
BRC prepared a "Contingency Removal" which contained the following provision: 
Seller hereby guarantees to deliver to purchaser a valid lease which has a base 
rent of $2,281 per month for the first 24 months. Plus three years additional 
with an adjusted base tied to the C.P.I, plus one five year option to renew; 
also tied to the Consumer Price Index. The Lease shall be Triple-Net. The 
Lease will be drawn up outside the Closing. 
See R. 71 at (emphasis added). Though Eagar had not asked BRC to prepare the 
Contingency Removal, BRC presented it to Eagar who, believing that document was 
customary in this type of transaction, signed it on January 8,1997. Bell also signed. See R. 
119 a t ! 18. Bell and Eagar closed on the sale of the Business the following week through 
a "Purchase Agreement" prepared by BRC. See R. 119 a t ! 19; R. 64-65. 
After the closing, Bell took possession of the Property and began operating the 
Business. See R. 119 at f 20. Eagar gave Bell a proposed written lease agreement in 
approximately July of 1997, which Bell rejected, alleging that the terms varied from the 
Counteroffer and Contingency Removal. See id. a t ! 21. In October 1997, Eagar offered 
Bell another proposed written lease agreement with lease payment terms to which Eagar had 
agreed before closing: (1) a five-year lease term with an option to renew for five additional 
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years; (2) discounted rent of $2,281.00 per month for the first two years, then adjusted to 
market rate thereafter with annual adjustments for subsequent years based upon the CPI; and 
(3) the lease was "triple net," with Bell paying property taxes, utilities, maintenance and 
insurance. See id. at ^ f 22. Bell rejected the second lease, contending that after the first two 
discounted years, the lease payment should not rise to the market rate, but only by annual 
increases based on the CPI. See id. at ^ f 23. Under Bell's proposal, lease payments would 
remain significantly below fair-market value throughout the life of the lease and would cause 
Eagar to lose over $85,000 in last eight years of the lease. Eagar rejected that notion. See 
id. at f 24. 
Bell and Eagar never agreed on how the CPI operated to increase the lease payments. 
The parties never discussed it directly or through Hatch or Brassard. Bell said only that he 
construed the CPI language based on assumptions he formed through his business 
experience. See R. 231 (p. 24); R. 232 (p. 25); R. 238-39 (pp. 52-54). The parties also never 
agreed on which year's CPI to use. They never discussed this either directly or through 
others. Again, Bell simply assumed that the 1998 CPI would be used. See id. R. 238-39 
(pp. 52-55). 
Bell did not allege that the parties agreed to any lease terms beyond duration and 
lease payments. Rather, Bell testified that he rejected all Eagar's lease drafts that Eagar that 
included any terms other than lease duration and payment. Bell testified that the "lease" he 
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sought to enforce on summary judgment "does not include all of the terms of the lease." See 
R. 233 (p. 32); R. 236 (p. 44); R. 238 (p. 49); R. 240-41 (pp. 59-61); R. 252-299. 
Despite receiving multiple proposed lease drafts, Bell never advised Eagar that in his 
view a valid binding lease already existed. Instead, Bell sent Eagar proposed modifications 
to those drafts. See R. 236 (p. 42); 237-38 (pp. 46-49); R. 239 (pp. 55-56); R. 240-41 (pp. 
59-62). In the end, Bell testified that "[t]he parties have never agreed to any lease." R. 237 
(p. 48, line 17). 
The trial court found that the Counteroffer and Contingency Removal were 
unambiguous and that Eagar's extrinsic evidence was precluded, granted Bell's motion for 
partial summary judgment and denied Eagar's motion. R. 539-541; 590 at 28-30. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. If a contract term is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is 
ambiguous and the court must consider extrinsic evidence to discern its meaning. Here, the 
trial court ruled that the Counteroffer and Contingency Removal unambiguously provide that 
lease payments would be adjusted after twenty four months only as dictated by the CPI, with 
no increase to market value in the third year. The court refused to consider the mass of 
extrinsic evidence establisheding that the monthly lease payment was to be increased from 
$2,281 per month to fair-market value after twenty-four months, and then adjusted annually 
by referring to the CPI. 
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Both parties' interpretations of the payment provision are plausible. Thus, the trial 
court should have considered extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent. The trial 
court's refusal to do so, and its grant of summary judgment for Bell, were erroneous and 
should be reversed. 
B. Disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for Bell. Bell 
argued that he and Eagar created a valid lease. However, he testified that the parties never 
agreed to any lease. Additional evidence established that the parties did not reach agreement 
as to all, or even a significant number of, the essential terms of the alleged lease, including 
the lease payment. The trial court erred by granting Bell's motion in the face of that 
contradictory evidence. 
C. Eagar was entitled to declaratory judgment that, as a matter of law, no 
enforceable lease existed. Eagar sought an order declaring that no lease existed because the 
parties had not agreed to all essential terms. Bell failed to profer admissible evidence that he 
and Eagar agreed to all essential terms. Because of this fatal omission, the trial court's denial 
of Eagar's motion was erroneous. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE ALLEGED LEASE 
PAYMENT TERM UNAMBIGUOUS, AND BY PRECLUDING 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF ITS MEANING . 
The trial court rule — on summary judgment — that the Counteroffer and Contingency 
Removal were unambiguous. R. 539-541; 590 at 28-30. It incorrectly read them to provide 
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for the lease payments Bell suggested, rejecting evidence establishing that the payment was 
to rise to fair-market value after twenty-four months, and then adjust annually by referring 
to the CPI. See id. These rulings are erroneous as a matter of law and should be reversed. 
"Under the basic principles of contract law, a contract is not formed unless there is a 
meeting of the minds." See Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995); see also 
Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) ("[i]t is 
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential 
to the formation of a contract"). Such mutual assent "requires assent by all parties to the 
same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms." See Crimson v. 
Western Co. of North Am.. 742 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). To determine 
whether a meeting of minds occurred, the court must first discern the meaning of the disputed 
provision. If the provision is ambiguous or uncertain, the court should consider extrinsic 
evidence. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996); Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). A contract is ambiguous if 
it is unclear, omits terms, or if terms used to express the intention of the parties may be 
understood to have two or more plausible meanings. See Seare v. University of Utah School 
of Medicine. 882 P.2d 673, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). To test ambiguity, "any relevant 
evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-
sided, namely, it is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic 
education and experience." Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
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After considering all relevant evidence, if the court finds ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is 
admissible " to explain the intent of the parties." See Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. 
Pioneer Oil and Gas Co.. 899 P.2d 766, 700 (Utah 1995). 
Here, the alleged lease was ambiguous and demanded extrinsic evidence to give it 
meaning. The parties agreed that monthly lease payments would be $2,281 for twenty-four 
months, with an "adjusted base" thereafter tied to the CPI. See R. 71. However, the parties 
disagreed on the meaning of "adjusted base." Bell says the provision means that monthly 
lease payments will increase in the third and subsequent years only by the percentage 
reflected by the CPI. Eagar intended for payments to rise in the third year to fair-market 
value, and in subsequent years according to the CPI. 
On its face, the contract alone offers insufficient guidance for the trial court to 
determine the correct interpretation. Both interpretations are plausible. Thus, as a matter of 
law, the payment provision is ambiguous. See Seare, 882 P.2d at 677 (holding that contract 
is ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if terms used to express the intention of the 
parties may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings). As an ambiguous term, 
the trial court should have considered the illuminating extrinsic evidence to determine the 
parties' intent. See Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co., 899 P.2d at 700. The trial court erred by 
refusing to do so. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING BELL'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
1. EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT THE PARTIES NEVER 
AGREED TO A LEASE CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, 
The evidence raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment 
for Bell. While Bell argued that he and Eagar created a valid lease, he testified earlier that 
"[t]he parties have never agreed to any lease." R. 237 (p. 48, line 17). Bell conceded that, 
although Eagar had submitted several proposed leases, Bell he never advised Eagar that he 
believed a valid, binding lease already existed. See R. 236 (p. 42); 237-38 (pp. 46-49); R. 
239 (pp. 55-56); R. 240-41 (pp. 59-62). Bell also admitted that he offered written 
modifications to Eagar's proposed lease. See R. 236 (p. 42); 237-38 (pp. 46-49); R. 239 (pp. 
55-56); R. 240-41 (pp. 59-62). 
Such evidence ~ from Bell himself- established genuine issues of fact (or established 
outright) that Bell believed that the parties had not reached any agreement (no meeting of 
minds), but were negotiating a mutually-acceptable lease. This evidence, and all reasonable 
inferences derived therefrom, viewed in Eagar's favor, precluded summary judgment for Bell 
as a matter of law. See Crimson. 742 P.2d at 1222 ("the subsequent leases exchanged by the 
parties demonstrates that there was no meeting of the minds"); Willard Pease Oil and Gas 
Ca, 899 P.2d at 766 (noting that all the evidence and inferences therefrom must be viewed 
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in the light most favorable to the non-moving party). The trial court erred by ruling on 
summary judgment that the parties had agreed to a lease. 
2. EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PARTIES NEVER 
AGREED TO ALL MATERIAL TERMS OF A LEASE. 
Under Utah law, Bell had to prove through undisputed evidence, that he and Eagar 
agreed to all essential lease terms. See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc., 928 P.2d at 373 ("It 
is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is 
essential to the formation of a contract'9); see also Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Ouintek, 834 
P.2d 582, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("in order to create an enforceable contract, the parties 
must mutually agree to all essential terms of the supposed agreement") (internal quotation 
and citation omitted); Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Prod., Inc., 893 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995) ("[A] contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the 
parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed") (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Court must examine the 
circumstances surrounding an alleged agreement to identify the essential terms. See 
Crimson, 742 P.2d at 1221-22. The trial court failed to do so in this case. 
The alleged contract in this case was a lease of commercial office and warehouse 
space. The essential terms of such a lease would include much more than duration and 
monthly payments. Other material issues may include: (1) the payment of utilities and other 
operating expenses; (2) permitted uses of the property; (3) maintenance, repair and alteration 
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of the premises; (4) landlord's access to the premises; (5) the parties' rights upon damage or 
destruction of the premises; (6) expiration or termination of the lease; (7) indemnification; 
(8) security deposits; (9) insurance on the premises; (10) events of default and remedies; and 
(11) whether the lease can be assigned. Yet, Bell did not even allege agreement on any of 
these terms. Bell testified that he rejected Eagar's proposed leases that included provisions 
governing those critical issues. Ultimately, Bell conceded that the alleged lease "does not 
include all of the terms of the lease." See R. 233 (p. 32); R. 236 (p. 44); R. 238 (p. 49); R. 
240-41 (pp. 59-61); R. 252-299. 
In sum, as Bell's testimony confirms, the parties did not agree on all, or even a 
significant number of, the essential terms of the alleged lease. The evidence discussed above 
— viewed in light most favorable to Eagar — created a genuine issue of material fact that 
precluded summary judgment for Bell. The trial court erred by granting Bell's motion. 
3. EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PARTIES NEVER 
AGREED TO THE ALLEGED LEASE PAYMENT. 
Even if undisputed evidence established all essential lease terms except for lease 
payment (and it did not), Bell still would had to show that he Eagar agreed to the same lease 
payment. See Sadder, 897 P.2d atl220; Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc.. 928 P.2d at 373; 
Crimson, 742 P.2d at 1221. Bell failed to carry this burden. 
Evidence established that monthly lease payments for twenty-four months would be 
$2,281 with an "adjusted base" thereafter tied to the CPI. R. 71. However, evidence also 
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showed that Eagar believed "adjusted base" meant that the payment would be adjusted in the 
third year to fair-market value, and in subsequent years as dictated by the CPI. See R. 117 
at f 13; R. 220-21 at ^  If 12 & 13. On the other hand, Bell says he believed it meant that the 
payment would be adjusted only as dictated by the CPI, with no increase to market value in 
the third year. R. 56-61. Because both interpretations are facially plausible, the trial court 
was constrained to consider extrinsic evidence on intent, including evidence presented by 
Eagar, to determine the correct interpretation. See Interwest Constr.. 923 P.2d at 1359; 
Ward. 907 P.2d at 268; Seare. 882 P.2d at 677; Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co.. 899 P.2d at 
700. 
The evidence discussed above established that Eagar and Bell never agreed to the 
monthly lease payments Bell urges, or even which year's CPI would be used. See R. 117 at 
ff 12 & 13; R. 119 a t t 24; R. 220-21 at t t u> 1 2 & 1 3 ; R- 238-39 (pp. 52-55). The trial 
court had to accept Eagar's evidence as true on summary judgment, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in Eagar's favor. See C. Sanchez and Son, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 
1541 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373, 1379 (5th Cir. 1994).1 Where 
that evidence and the associated inferences reveal genuine issues of fact, summary judgment 
*Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is substantially similar to Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (Compiler's Notes). Thus, this Court 
can freely refer to authorities which have interpreted the federal counterpart. See Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990); Wilson v. 
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); Miller v. Brocksmith. 825 P.2d 690 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
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is precluded. See Fitzgerald v. General Dairies. Inc., 590 F.2d 874, 875 (10th Cir. 1979); 
Cox, v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie. 17 F.3d 1386,1396 (11th Cir. 1994). At most, 
the evidence suggested a "concept" was developing for monthly lease payments in the third 
year and subsequent years. However, no clear method for establishing the exact amount was 
agreed upon. Such a conceptual framework is insufficient for summary judgment as a matter 
of law. See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc., 928 P.2d at 373. The trial court's summary 
judgment should be reversed. 
C. EAGAR IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Bell's failure to establish all essential terms of the alleged lease also confirms Eagar's 
entitlement to summary judgment that no enforceable lease existed. Eagar sought a 
declaration that no lease existed because the parties had not agreed to all essential terms. To 
defeat Eagar's motion, Bell had to profer admissible evidence that he and Eagar agreed to 
all essential terms. See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc., 928 P.2d at 373 ("It is fundamental 
that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the 
formation of a contract"); Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 834 P.2d at 584 ("in order to create 
an enforceable contract, the parties must mutually agree to all essential terms of the supposed 
agreement") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Piston, 893 P.2d at 1075 ("[A] 
contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with 
sufficient defmiteness that it can be performed"). Bell failed to do so, responding only with 
conclusory allegations. See R. 399-402; 504-05. As a matter of law, the undisputed facts 
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established by Eagar's extrinsic evidence should have been deemed admitted for purposes 
of Eagar's motion. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Don 
Houston, M.D., Inc. v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 933 P.2d 403, 407 n.6 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997); Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170,1172 (Utah 1983). Those facts established that 
Bell and Eagar did not agree on the essential elements of the alleged lease. Thus, Eagar was 
entitled to declaratory judgment that, as a matter of law, no enforceable lease existed. The 
trial court's denial of Eagar's motion was therefore erroneous and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Eagar respectfully requests that this Court: (1) reverse the 
trial court's grant of Bell's motion for partial summary judgment; (2) reverse the trial court's 
denial of Eagar's motion for summary judgment; and (3) remand the matter for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's rulings. 
DATED this 27th day of April, 2000. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
"^Paul M. Durham 
Steve K. Gordon 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaimant 
and Appellant James LeRoy Eagar 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56 - SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is 
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. 
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial 
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at 
any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith 
or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them 
to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party 
or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE 4-501 - MOTIONS 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and 
documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district courts except proceedings before 
the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for 
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and Service of Motions and Memoranda. 
(a) Motion and Supporting Memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities, appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, 
exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting 
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of 
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on 
ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, 
the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum 
is in excess often pages, the application shall include a summary of the memorandum, not 
to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. The responding party shall file and serve 
upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided 
in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum 
within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum. 
(d) Notice to Submit for Decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file 
a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned 
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment. 
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(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion. The points and authorities in support of 
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement 
of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. The points and authorities in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to 
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall 
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material 
facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the 
Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any issues 
in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal 
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written request for a 
hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues 
governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party. 
When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the 
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the 
matter for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion 
shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date 
set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and 
time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their principal 
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled 
trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the Court. 
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(4) Expedited Dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the 
court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the 
essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the 
motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone Conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may 
direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A 
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested 
by counsel. 
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